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Over the last ten years, foreign direct investment in the United
States has increased dramatically.' A substantial component of this
trend has been the acquisition of domestic corporations by firms from
a small group of highly developed countries.2 Although acquisitions
can be structured in a variety of ways, foreign acquirers, unlike their
1. Foreign direct investment increased from $11.8 billion in 1969 to $40.8 billion in
1978, an increase of over 254%. DeVlin, The International Investment Position of the
United States: Developments in 1970, SURVEY CURRENT Bus., Oct. 1971, at 21; Scholl, The
International Investment Position of the United States: Developments in 1978, SURVEY
CURRENT Bus., Aug. 1979, at 56. "Foreign direct investment" is defined as a holding of
greater than 10% of the voting securities of an incorporated business enterprise or an
equivalent interest in an unincorporated enterprise by foreign persons. U.S. Dep't of
Commerce News, Aug. 23, 1979 (Indus. & Trade Admin. No. 79-138). Foreign portfolio in-
vestment, such as the passive holding of small amounts of stock, corporate bonds, and
United States government obligations, is the residual of private foreign investment in the
United States. Id.
Foreign direct investment comprises about 23% of all private foreign investment in the
United States. See Scholl, supra, at 56. For a discussion of some of the factors explaining
this increase, see Note, The Rising Tide of Reverse Flow: Would a Legislative Breakwater
Violate U.S. Treaty Commitments? 72 MxCH. L. REv. 551, 552-53 (1974) [hereinafter cited as
Rising Tide]; Note, Foreign Direct Investment in the United States: Possible Restrictions
at Home and a New Climate for American Investment Abroad, 26 AM. L. REv. 109, 114-15
(1976).
2. 1 U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT IN THE UNITED STATES 115
(1976) (from 1970 to 1975, 58% of sampled foreign direct investment was acquisitions)
[hereinafter cited as FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT]. The volume of foreign acquisitions
has not declined. See U.S. Dep't of Commerce News, Aug. 23, 1979 (Indus. & Trade
Admin. No. 79-138) (preliminary 1978 figures report 261 acquisitions, mergers and equity
increases). Acquiring firms come predominantly from the United Kingdom, Canada,
Federal Republic of Germany, Japan, France, Switzerland, and the Netherlands. Id. This
Note defines a "foreign acquirer" as a business enterprise, domiciled in a nation belong-
ing to the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), that seeks
to gain control of an American corporation. The condition of OECD affiliation guarantees
that the business enterprise is subject to a certain and increasing level of domestic regula-
tion. The OECD has recommended standards for minimum disclosure rules. OECD,
MINIMUM DISCLOSURE RULES APPLICABLE TO ALL PUBLICLY OFFERED SECURITIES (1976). All
countries named above, except Switzerland, belong to the International Accounting Stan-
dards Committee, which publishes accounting standards enforceable by disciplinary pro-
ceedings. British Accountant Sees Progress in Setting International Standards, SEC. REG. &
L. REP. (BNA), Jan. 29, 1975, at A-17. In addition, the European Economic Community
(EEC), of which many of these countries are members, has made significant progress in
establishing minimum disclosure requirements for listed companies, Proposed Sixth
Council Directive, reprinted in [1978] COMM. MKT. REP. (CCH) 1405, and standardizing
accounting practices, Fourth Council Directive 78/660/EEC, 21 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L
222) 11 (1978), [1978] Comm. MKT. REP. (CCH) 911391.
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domestic counterparts, use cash as consideration in virtually all acquisi-
tions.3
This Note contends that the existing regulatory framework is a
determinant of the acquisition form.4 Certain tax and securities regula-
tions5 add costs to foreigners' securities acquisition transactions that
domestic acquirers do not have to bear, steering foreign acquirers
toward acquisitions structured as cash transactions. This regulatory
effect contradicts stated United States policy on foreign investment and
international capital movements. The Note therefore advocates adop-
tion of a "standard of regulative neutrality" between foreign and do-
mestic acquirers. The Note establishes a "criterion of effective parity"
to implement this standard and uses that criterion to propose modifica-
tions in the existing regulatory framework.
I. Acquisition Structuring and the Regulatory Impact on
Foreign Acquirers
The choice of a particular transaction structure, based upon the
acquirer's evaluation of the structure's costs and advantages, affects the
viability and efficiency of the transaction. 6 Regulations that impose
higher costs on foreign securities acquisitions, as compared to those of
3. 1 FOREIGN DiREcr INVESTMENT, supra note 2, at 116 (only four of forty-one acquisitions
sampled used voting securities; three of these were pre-1970). This Note refers to acquisi-
tions using equity securities as consideration as "securities acquisitions." The only post-
1970 securities acquisition, that of Alloys Unlimited, Inc. by Plessey Co. Ltd., occurred in
1971. Goldberg, Tax Considerations in Structuring the Acquisition of a US. Corporation,
in CURRENT LEGAL ASPECTS OF FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN THE UNITED STATES 145, 145 (D.
Evans, J. Forry, V. Narcisi, & M. Perlberger eds. 1976). In the domestic context, however,
securities acquisitions are showing signs of becoming more frequent. See Wall St. J., Dec.
5, 1979, at 1, col. 6 (report on letter by Federal Reserve Board Chairman Volcker). The
SEC has been receiving an increasing number of requests from foreign parties for informa-
tion on such acquisitions. Interview with Ronald Adee, Office of International Corporate
Finance, SEC Division of Corporate Finance, in Washington, D.C., Nov. 13, 1979 (notes on
file with Yale Law Journal).
4. Economic conditions can also make cash a desirable form of consideration for
foreign acquirers. These conditions include a favorable exchange rate, large dollar sur-
pluses from the chronic United States current account deficit, and "undervalued" U.S.
assets and stock that make the tax benefits to the acquired's shareholders less attractive.
See note 18 infra.
5. I.R.C. § 367; Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77mm (1976 & Supp. 1977)
[hereinafter cited as Securities Act].
6. Many commentators assume that a decision to acquire has been made and that
structuring is merely a technical choice of the best method. See, e.g., Nathan, Securities
and Related Legal Factors in Planning a U.S. Acquisition by a Foreign Purchaser, in
FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN THE UNITED STATES 25, 28 (2d ed. J. Marans, P. Williams, & A.
Mirabito eds. 1978); Young, The Acquisition of United States Businesses by Foreign In-
vestors, 30 Bus. LAw. 111, 115 (1974). It may be, however, that the ability to structure an
acquisition satisfactorily actually determines whether or not the acquisition can be con-
summated. See J. FREUND, ANATOMY OF A MERGER 120 (1975). The structuring decision has
important consequences for the essential terms of the transaction. See id.; 5 FOREIGN DIRECT
INVESTMENT, supra note 2, at H-31.
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domestic acquirers, can severely restrict the range of structuring op-
tions available to foreign acquirers.
A. Structuring the Acquisition
United States tax and securities regulations provide the framework
of structuring options for an acquisition transaction.7 The basic regula-
tory distinctions depend upon the types of consideration used-cash,
debt instruments, or equity securities. In cases in which debt or equity
securities are used,8 the securities rules distinguish between transac-
tions in which stock of the acquired corporation is bought9 and those
in which the assets are purchased or the acquired corporation is merged
with the acquirer.10 The type of consideration determines the level of
disclosure required. In addition, in acquisitions involving equity securi-
ties, the tax statutes also contain a classification system. Under section
368 of the Internal Revenue Code transactions that fall into any of the
following three categories will be eligible for tax-free treatment:'"
7. Schmults, Forms of Transactions, in MERGERS AND AcquIsITiONS 54, 54 (J. McCord
ed. 1969). Tax and securities regulations control the structuring of a transaction; they do
not specifically prohibit transactions. See Elmer & Johnson, Legal Obstacles to Foreign
Acquisitions of U.S. Corporations, 30 Bus. LAW. 681, 684 (1975) (regulations do not directly
prohibit foreign acquisitions).
The paradigm of structuring options that follows in the text is a formal one. Al-
though most acquisition transactions will involve some added twists or even combina-
tions of forms, such as two-step transactions, the possibilities presented in this Note are
simplified in order to highlight the legal issues.
8. The use of securities "in an acquisition transaction constitutes a public offering
under section 5 of the Securities Act. See Nathan, supra note 6, at 43. Rule 146, 17 C.F.R.
§ 230.146 (1979), and the statutory exemptions to section 5, §§ 3(a)(10)-(l1), 4(2), are avail-
able to foreign acquirers seeking to conduct securities acquisitions.
9. The exchange offer is a type of tender offer in which the acquired's shareholders
exchange their shares for shares of the acquirer. Nathan, supra note 6, at 39. The acquirer's
shares must be registered on Form S-1. See Borden, Federal Securities Laws, in BUSINESS
AcquisITIoNs: PLANNING AND PRACrIcE 5 (J.'Herz & C. Baller eds. 1971) (Supp. 1973). If the
issuer satisfies a number of conditions including being registered pursuant to section 12(b)
of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 781(b) (1976) [hereinafter cited as
Exchange Act], and having filed all required reports under sections 13, 14, or 15(d) for
a period of at least 36 months, it may use Form S-7. 17 C.F.R. § 239.26(a)-.26(b) (1979).
Thus, when an acquisition is a foreign acquirer's first dealing with the United States
securities market, a Form S-I registration is required.
10. Assets and merger transactions fall under the requirements of Rule 145, 17 C.F.R.
§ 230.145 (1979). Registration of a public offering under Rule 145 allows the use of Form
S-14. Borden, supra note 9, at 24-26. In essence, Form S-14 consists of a merger proxy
statement. Corporations already obligated to comply with Regulation 14A, 17 C.F.R.
§ 240.14a (1979), because of prior registration under the Exchange Act or Securities Act,
will incur little additional expense in filing Form S-14. See Borden, supra note 9, at 25.
11. See I.R.C. § 368(a)(1) (defining transactions that will be "reorganizations" for pur-
poses of §§ 301-367). I.R.C. § 368(a)(2)(D) provides for subsidiary mergers in which the
acquired is merged into a subsidiary of the acquiring corporation. I.R.C. § 368(a)(2)(E)
provides for reverse subsidiary mergers in which a subsidiary of the acquiring corporation
is merged into the acquired corporation. In both cases, the acquired corporation receives
the stock of the parent corporation.
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mergers (type-A), 12 stock for stock exchanges (type-B), 13 and sales of
assets (type-C). 14
An acquirer thus faces a variety of structuring possibilities, each with
distinct costs and benefits. Several factors are relevant to the choice
among these options: financial considerations, such as the most desir-
able type of consideration, 15 tax consequences,' the continued partici-
pation of the acquired corporation's shareholders,' 7 and the likelihood
of shareholder approval.' s Moreover, various transaction costs affect the
outcome of the structuring decision.' 9
In addition to business considerations and transaction costs, struc-
turing of an acquisition will also depend upon regulatory costs. Such
costs assume three forms: compliance costs, liability costs, and time-
delay costs. SEC filings, legal fees, and corporate personnel expenses
12. I.R.C. § 368(a)(1)(A). A type-A reorganization is a statutory merger in which the
acquirer's stock is issued to the acquired's shareholders.
13. I.R.C. § 368(a)(1)(B). A type-B reorganization occurs when the acquirer issues voting
stock to the acquired's shareholders in return for their voting stock in the acquired. In
general, this acquisition form is less frequently used, because it does not "by itself
eliminate the possibility of an unacquirable minority interest." Pugh & Samuels, Tax-Free
International Corporate Combinations under New Sections 367 and 1491, 30 TAx LAW.
263, 267 (1978).
14. I.R.C. § 368(a)(1)(C). A type-C reorganization is a sale of substantially all of the
acquired's assets in which the acquired receives stock of the acquirer. The problems in-
herent in having to transfer corporate assets individually make use of this type less
frequent. Pugh & Samuels, supra note 13, at 267.
15. See Pugh & Samuels, supra note 13, at 43. The Department of Commerce study
found that several aspects of the form of consideration affect the structuring decision, in-
cluding foreign capital outflow restrictions, relative cash position and capital structure of
the acquirer, and the cost and terms of available capital. 5 FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT,
supra note 2, at H-33 to H-34.
16. In a tax-free acquisition, the acquirer receives as a carryover basis in the stock or
property, its basis in the hands of the acquired. I.R.C. § 362(b). The acquirer, however,
will often desire a step-up in basis of assets purchased in order to attain a higher de-
preciation allowance during its operation of the business. This would dictate a cash
acquisition of assets rather than a purchase or exchange of stock. On the other hand, the
acquirer may want to take advantage of the tax history of the acquired; in a tax-free
reorganization, the acquiring corporation succeeds to the acquired's net operating loss
carryovers. I.R.C. § 381. A tax-free reorganization may be desired by the acquired's share-
holders because of the basis provision. I.R.C. § 358(a) (1); see Young, supra note 6, at 127-
28 (selling shareholders accept lower price than would if transaction taxable).
17. See Kamin & Asofsky, Choice of Securities in Corporate Acquisitions-Primarily Tax
Factors, in 2 BUSINESs ACQUISITIONS: PLANNING AND PRACTICE 719, 719 (J. Herz & C. Bailer
eds. 1971). Shareholders who receive stock instead of cash or senior securities will be subject
to future fluctuations in the acquiring firm's performance. Id. at 721. Moreover, the
acquiring corporation may not want a large block of stock retained by one group.
Schmults, supra note 7, at 64.
18. Shareholder approval is usually necessary in merger and sale of assets transactions.
See, e.g., Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, §§ 251, 271 (1976).
19. Transaction costs include valuation expenses, see Bangser, Negotiations and Plan-
ning, in I BUSINEss ACQUISITIONS: PLANNING AND PRACTICE 1, 10-20 (J. Herz & C. Baller eds.
1971); negotiating costs, see id. at 31; and the risks of the transaction collapsing, see
ACQUISITION AND MERGER NEGOTIATION STRATEGY 170-71 (M. Strage ed. 1971).
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comprise compliance costs. The risk of subsequent disputes and litiga-
tion comprises liability costs. Time-delay costs are incurred when
regulations postpone consummation of the transaction. 20 Regulation,
from this viewpoint, is not extraneous to the structuring decision, but
appears as a cost within it. When regulations treat classes of acquirers
disparately, their respective regulatory costs will differ. That disparity
will affect their structuring decisions even if the other cost factors do
not vary.
B. Regulatory Discrimination
Several tax and securities regulations increase the regulatory costs
of structuring securities acquisitions for foreign acquirers, but not for
domestic acquirers.
1. Tax Provisions
Two sections of the Internal Revenue Code are particularly burden-
some to foreign acquirers: sections 367(a) and 368. Section 367(a) re-
quires a ruling from the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) on certain
tax-free exchanges2' involving transfers of property from persons in the
United States to foreign corporations. Under Treasury regulations,
moreover, all tax-free securities acquisitions of domestic corporations
by foreign corporations require an IRS ruling.2 2 If the parties do not
obtain such a ruling within a specified period2 3 the transaction will be
taxable.2 4 IRS guidelines specify the requirements for tax-free treat-
20. Timing is a key factor in successful acquisition transactions, especially those in-
dexed to market values. 5 FoREiGr DIRECr INVESTMENT, supra note 2, at H-33. Significant
time delays can be involved in securing necessary IRS rulings and in preparing and
gaining approval of SEC registration. Young, suPra note 6, at 126, 128.
21. I.R.C. § 367(a) (specifying exchanges under six sections of Code that require IRS
ruling). See Feinschreiber, Outbound Transfers-The Procedural Aspects, 5 INT'L TAx J.
137, 137-38 (1978) (listing types of outbound transactions).
22. Treas. Reg. § 7.367(a)-(l) (1977). The ruling requirement is designed to minimize
the tax avoidance potential of the expatriation of appreciated assets or inventory from
the United States tax jurisdiction. See H.R. REP. No. 658, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 242,
reprinted in [1976] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2897, 3138 [hereinafter cited as 1976
HoUSE REPORT].
23. The period is 183 days after the beginning of the transfer. I.R.C. § 367(a); see
Alpert & Feingold, Tax Return Act toughens foreign transfer Provisions of 1491 and
liberalizes 367, 46 J. TAx. 2, 6-7 (1977) (unclear when "beginning" of transfer occurs).
24. Failure to comply with § 367(a) does not block the exchange. Rev. Rul. 67-192, 1967-
2 C.B. 140. The foreign corporation loses its "corporation" status, which simply removes
the tax-free nature of the transaction normally available under the applicable Code sec-
tions. Id. This consequence is severe, however, if a major purpose of the transaction's
structure was to attain tax-free treatment. To protect itself, an acquired corporation
would obviously agree to such an acquisition only if it is conditional upon receiving a
favorable IRS ruling. The practical effect of not receiving a favorable ruling thus would
be to abort the transaction.
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ment in type-B and type-C foreign acquisitions,25 including the pos-
sible imposition of a toll charge in the latter case. 26 Type-A statutory
mergers are not available to foreign acquirers.2 7
These Internal Revenue Code provisions subject foreign acquirers
to reg-ulatory costs that domestic acquirers do not bear. The com-
pliance costs of the transaction are increased under any acquisition
form adopted: a section 367(a) ruling must be obtained; a toll charge
may be required; 28 and, in a merger, a domestic subsidiary must be
incorporated.
These tax regulations also impose additional liability risks on the
foreign acquirer. An unfavorable ruling will cause the acquired cor-
25. Rev. Proc. 68-23, 1968-1 C.B. 821. Type-B exchanges of voting securities will nor-
mally receive a favorable ruling, provided that the acquired domestic corporation's share-
holders do not obtain a controlling interest in the acquiring foreign corporation and that
the assets of the acquired domestic corporation do not consist primarily of stock or
securities. Id. § 3.03(l)(d). "Controlling interest" means more than 50% of the total voting
stock. Id. In cases in which the level of post-transaction ownership is 80% or more, the
guidelines for section 351 transactions apply. Id. § 3.02(l)(d).
26. A type-C sale of assets will receive a favorable ruling if the domestic corporation
agrees to include in its gross income for the current year an "appropriate" amount to
reflect the gain realized due to the appreciation of the assets transferred. Id. § 3.03(l)(a).
The guidelines provide that type-C reorganizations will be given the same treatment as
section 351 transactions. Type-C transactions are seldom free of toll charges. See Nicholson,
Farber, Gewanter, & Samuels, A Panel Discussion, 34 N.Y.U. INST. FED. TAX. 925, 940
(1976) (remarks of Leslie Samuels) (part of symposium entitled "Foreign Entities in the
United States") [hereinafter cited as Panel Discussion].
The amount of this toll charge is left to the discretion of the IRS. Rev. Proc. 68-23, 1968-
1 C.B. 821, allows the IRS to set the income figure that the acquired must include before
section 367 approval will be given. The taxpayer has no real recourse from an adverse
determination. Although the acquired corporation has the right to a review of the IRS
ruling, I.R.C. § 7477(a), the exchange must have begun before it can request a declaratory
judgment on the ruling, I.R.C. § 7477(b)(3). Although the transfers can be conducted on
the stipulation that they will be reversed if the final ruling is unsatisfactory, this require-
ment imposes large compliance costs and liability-risk costs on the structuring decision.
27. The regulations require that a merger be effected pursuant to domestic corporation
laws. Treas. Reg. § 1.368-2(b)(1). Some states explicitly authorize mergers involving entities
incorporated abroad. See, e.g., COLO. R.v. STAT. ANN. § 7-9-114 (1973); N.J. STAT. ANN.
§§ 14A: l-2(j), 14A: 10-7(1) (1969). Other states explicitly prohibit such mergers. See, e.g.,
ALA. CODE tit. 10, § 10-2-182 (1977); MD. CORP. & ASS'NS CODE ANN. §§ 3-101(b), 3-102(a)(2)
(1975). A number of other states and the Model Business Corporation Act are ambiguous;
their merger provisions fail to distinguish between entities incorporated in other states
and entities incorporated abroad. See, e.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 32, § 157.69a (Smith-Hurd
1954); TFX. Rev. Civ. STAT. ANN. tit. 31, art. 5.07A (Vernon 1956); ABA-ALI MODEL Bus.
CORP. Aar § 2(b) (1970).
A foreign acquirer can accomplish a type-A merger only by merging the acquired
domestic corporation with a domestic subsidiary of the acquiring foreign firm. This can
be accomplished by either a direct subsidiary merger, see I.R.C. § 368(a)(2)(D), or a reverse
subsidiary merger, see I.R.C. § 368(a)(2)(E). The policy reasons underlying the restriction
of foreign acquirers to such circuitous merger structures are unclear. See Panel Discussion,
suPra note 26, at 939 (remarks of Leslie Samuels).
28. The acquired in a foreign acquisition is forced to recognize gains prior to any




poration's shareholders to recognize gains but not losses.29 In a type-C
transaction, any acquisition begun prior to a section 367(a) ruling may
incur an undetermined toll charge. Both possibilities magnify the
downside risks of the structuring decision.
The foreign acquirer, moreover, must bear time-delay costs not
borne by domestic acquirers. The prudent acquirer would seek a ruling
in advance.30 A type-A transaction must await the incorporation of a
domestic subsidiary. Thus, additional time will elapse between the
initial planning and the consummation of the acquisition.
2. Securities Regulations
A decision to finance an acquisition with securities will involve the
foreign acquirer in a public offering, which must be registered under
the Securities Act.31 Registration entails both initial disclosure and
subsequent reporting of the issuer's status. 32 In addition, the acquirer
will become subject to domestic liability provisions, 33 particularly Rule
1Ob-5. 34 Although the foreign acquirer is treated no differently from
the domestic acquirer under the Securities Act,35 its different relation-
29. Rev. Rul. 67-192, 1967-2 C.B. 140; see Ginsburg, Acquisitive Reorganizations, in
SEC AND TAX CONSEQUENCES OF CORPORATE ACQUISITIONS 2D 7, 119 (M. Ginsburg & L.
Schneider eds. 1970).
30. Sturm, Taxation of the Foreign Investor in the United States, 55 TAXES 542, 560
n.175 (1977). This is particularly true in type-C transactions, in which the decision to
structure the acquisition on a tax-free basis may depend upon the size of the toll charge.
31. Securities Act § 5, 15 U.S.C. § 77e (1976). See note 8 supra (securities used in
securities acquisitions must be registered). Because it is unlikely that the acquired
corporation would accept securities in a private offering and agree never to distribute
them, at some point the foreign acquirer will have to register under the Securities Act.
See GEORGETOWN U. SCHOOL OF LAW, INSTITUTE FOR INTERNATIONAL AND FOREIGN TRADE
LAW, LEGAL ENVIRONMENT FOR FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT IN THE UNITED STATES 107
(1972) [hereinafter cited as GEORGETOWN STUDY].
32. See Securities Act § 5, 15 U.S.C. § 77e (1976); Exchange Act § 15(d), 15 U.S.C.
§ 78o(d) (1976). The purpose of the Securities Act is "[t]o provide full and fair disclosure
of the character of securities sold in interstate and foreign commerce and through the
mails, and to prevent frauds in the sale thereof. Securities Act, Pub. L. No. 73-22,
preamble, 48 Stat. 74 (1933).
33. Securities Act § 5, 15 U.S.C. § 77e (1976) (liability for failing to register properly);
id. § 10(b), 15 U.S.C. § 77j(b) (1976) (liability for registration deficiency); id. § lla, 15
U.S.C. § 77k(a) (1976) (liability to private civil suit for material factual deficiencies in
registration statement); id. § 17(a), 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a) (1976) (criminal liability for fraudu-
lent offer or sale); Exchange Act § 9, 15 U.S.C. § 78i (1976) (liability for manipulation of
securities prices); id. § 10, 15 U.S.C. § 78j (1976) (liability for use of manipulative or
deceptive devices); id. § 14(e), 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e) (1976) (liability for misleading statements
in tender offers); id. § 16(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1976) (liability for profits fr'om insider
transactions within six-month period); id. § 18(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78r(a) (1976) (liability to
private suit for material factual deficiencies in SEC filings).
34. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b.5 (1979).
35. L. RAPPAPORT, SEC ACCOUNTING PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 31.36 (3d ed. 1972).
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ship to the American regulatory framework imposes greater regulatory
costs on it.
In addition to the liability provisions of American securities laws
and associated liability risks that cause some concern, 36 compliance
costs also pose a substantial obstacle to the foreign acquirer. Foreign
acquirers have difficulty in conforming financial reports to SEC re-
quirements. Accounting principles vary between countries.37 More-
over, use of independent auditors is rare outside the United States.3s
Foreign issuers encounter additional difficulties in completing the
narrative portions of registration statements. 39 The SEC's common
requirement of a statement of world and national economic conditions
affecting the registrant further adds to the foreign acquirer's regulatory
burden.40
Although the SEC has recognized these difficulties, it has failed to
36. Foreign concern with liability provisions centers on the Exchange Act, particularly
the per se civil liability provisions of section 16(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1976). See Stephens,
Reevaluation of Disclosure Requirements for Foreign Issuers: Securities Exchange Act of
1934, 45 GEO. WASH. L. Rav. 494, 501-02 (1977). Rule 13a12-3, 17 C.F.R. § 240.3a12-3 (1979),
exempts foreign issuers who report on Form 20-F from the operation of section 16.
Although uncertainty in the evolution and application of Rule lob-5, see Buschman,
Antifraud and the Water's Edge: Transnational Transactions, Rule 10b-5, and the Federal
Securities Code, 7 SEC. REC. L.J. 232, 247-64 (1979) (summarizing judicial interpretations
of application of lob-5 to foreign issuers), may concern foreign acquirers, it does not
appear that liability under the Rule has a significantly disparate impact upon the
regulatory costs of structuring a foreign securities acquisition. Domestic and foreign
acquirers are equally subject to the Rule. Unlike the reporting procedures, therefore,
Rule lOb-5 does not impose immediate extra costs on foreign acquirers. Moreover, although
the modes of regulation vary, many nations-including those in which the most active
acquirers reside-do not tolerate misuse of inside information. See, e.g., MULTINATIONAL
APPROACHES-CORPORATE INSIDERS 23-63 (L. Loss ed. 1976); International Securities Project,
30 Bus. LAw. 585, 609-10, 630-31, 658, 667 (1975).
The EEC Commission has proposed a securities code that would require that the public
be fairly and adequately informed and that no particular class of persons be permitted to
attain a privileged position in the market. Recommendation Concerning a European Code
of Conduct Relating to Transactions in Transferable Securities, 20 O.J. Eur. Comm. (No.
L 212) 37, CII ENCYCLOPEDIA OF EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAW §§ C5-476 to -483 (1977).
Although Rule lOb-5 does apply to foreign issuers, commentators have not portrayed
such liability as a problem for foreign acquirers. When a foreign acquirer's domestic
regulatory system has nothing approximating such liability, the impact of possible Rule
lOb-5 violations on the structuring decision will be greater.
37. See L. RAPPAPORT, supra note 35, at 31.1; PRICE WATERHOUSE INTERNATIONAL, A
SURVEY IN 46 COUNTRIES (1975); Stephens, Reevaluation of Disclosure Requirements for
Foreign Issuers: Securities Act of 1933, 45 GEO. WASH. L. Rv. 135, 146 (1977).
38. Stephens, supra note 37, at 156-57. See L. RAPPAPORT, supra note 35, at 31.21 (con-
cept of independence abroad often differs from that in United States).
39. Difficulties arise in distinguishing lines of business, Investment Regulation, 11
LAw & PoL'Y INT'L Bus. 255, 270-73 (1979), describing management remuneration, Bator,
Offerings of Foreign Securities in the United States, in SIXTH ANNUAL INSTITUTE ON
SECURITIES REGULATION 309, 324 (1975); Stephens, supra note 37, at 159, or specifying share-
holder control, Bator, supra, at 324; Stephens, supra note 37, at 161-62.
40. See Rule 408, 17 C.F.R. § 230A08 (1979); Stephens, supra note 37, at 163.64.
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alleviate them.41 Instead of providing separate forms or regulations for
foreign registrants under the Securities Act,42 SEC policy has been to
accommodate foreign issuers on a case-by-case basis. 43 The need to
await specific SEC advice increases the acquirer's time-delay costs.4 4
The structural differences between a foreign and domestic acquirer's
relationship to the American regulatory framework accentuate the
foreign acquirer's compliance costs. 45 Normally, domestic acquirers
have previously raised capital and structured their financial reporting
systems in accordance with SEC and American accounting require-
ments. 40 Because domestic acquirers are familiar with the financial and
narrative reports required,47 their compliance costs in an acquisition
will stem primarily from updating their prior reports.
The compliance costs of a foreign acquirer, by contrast, will be
equivalent to those incurred in a domestic acquirer's initial encounter
with SEC regulation.48 The acquisition registration will often be the
foreign acquirer's first contact with the American regulatory frame-
work.49 Although the SEC is willing to make certain accommodations,
the requisite negotiations add to the time-delay costs. These added
regulatory costs can skew the structuring decision away from the securi-
ties technique in cases in which a domestic acquirer would not be under
41. Securities Act Rel. No. 5316, 37 Fed. Reg. 23,631 (1972); see Borden, supra note 9,
at 20.
42. Securities Act Rel. No. 6157, 44 Fed. Reg. 70,130 (1979); see Garrett, Is the SEC a
Barrier to New York's Role in International Finance? SEc. REG. & L. REP. (BNA), June 19,
1974, at D-1.
43. Securities Act Rel. No. 6157, 44 Fed. Reg. 70,130 (1979); Garrett, supra note 42, at
D-2. The SEC has in some cases permitted use of foreign financial statements, with
reconciliation to United States standards in the footnotes. Nathan, supra note 6, at 46.
The SEC has also shown some flexibility on the auditor independence requirement. Id.
Auditors must not be employees of the registrant, and any holdings of securities in the
registrant must be in the process of being sold. L. RAPPAFORT, supra note 35, at 31.22 to
.23. The SEC has not been flexible, however, about differences in auditing standards in
important areas, such as testing accounts receivable and inventories. The SEC has also
been inflexible on the need for consolidated financial statements. Nathan, supra note 6,
at 46.
44. See Young, supra note 6, at 128; ci. L. RAPPAPORT, supra note 35, at 31.19 (com-
pliance with auditor independence standards should be discussed with SEC in advance of
filing).
45. See Damm, The Economic Aspects of European Direct Investment in the United
States, in THE MULTINATIONAL CORPORATION IN THE WORLD ECONOMY 35, 40 (S. Rolfe & W.
Damm eds. 1970).
46. See Borden, supra note 9, at 25. See note 10 supra.
47. See L. RAPPAPORT, supra note 35, at 31.18.
48. See id. at 31.23; Nathan, supra note 6, at 50 (registration costs are high and pro-
cedure involves substantial time and effort).
49. See Comment, Foreign Acquisitions in the United States: A Challenge to the Po-
tential Competition Doctrine, 44 FoaRD-s L. REv. 301, 318-19 (1975).
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such pressure.50 This differential impact on foreign acquirers may,
along with other factors, explain the virtual absence of securities ac-
quisitions by foreign corporations.
II. The Standard of Regulative Neutrality
The American regulatory treatment of foreign securities acquisitions
must be examined in the context of United States policy on interna-
tional capital movements. That policy dictates a standard of regulative
neutrality that ensures nondiscriminatory treatment of foreign investors.
This standard could be implemented by a criterion of effective parity
that would guarantee that American regulations do not impede foreign
investors to a greater extent than domestic investors.
A. United States Policy on International Capital Movements
The United States has been a strong advocate of international free
trade since the Second World War.51 The theory underlying this policy
is that the world market operates most efficiently and fairly when un-
encumbered by artificial governmental restrictions.52 One of the po-
50. See Nathan, supra note 6, at 50 (securities regulations result in foreigners unwilling-
ness to use securities for acquisition). It is the additional acquisition costs, not the initial
regulatory establishment costs, that are relevant to the structuring decision. Cf. W.
NICHOLSON, MICROECONOMIc THEORY: BASIC PRINCIPLES AND EXTENSIONS 480 (2d ed. 1978)
(sunk costs irrelevant to profit-maximizing decision).
51. The United States has long welcomed foreign direct investment. See Katz, Foreign
Direct Investment in the United States, in 1 UNITED STATES INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC
POLICY IN AN INTERDEPENDENT WORLD 965, 966 (1971); Note, An Evaluation of the Need
for Further Statutory Controls on Foreign Direct Investment in the United States, 8 VAND.
J. TRANSNAT'L L. 147, 152-53 (1974). The United States became a net exporter of capital
only after World War I. Weintraub, Why the United States Welcomes Foreign Invest-
ments, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE CONFERENCE ON FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT IN THE UNITED
STATES 8, 9 (1970).
During some periods, the United States has retreated from this policy. See, e.g., Niehuss,
Foreign Investment in the United States: A Review of Government Policy, 16 VA. J. INT'L
L. 65, 65 (1975); Vagts, The Corporate Alien: Definitional Questions in Federal Restraints
on Foreign Enterprise, 74 HARv. L. REV. 1489, 1493 (1961).
52. U.S. COMM'N ON INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND INVESTMENT POLICY, REPORT TO THE
PRESIDENT: UNITED STATES INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC POLICY IN AN INTERDEPENDENT WORLD
178 (1971) [hereinafter cited as COMMISSION REPORT]; Weintraub, supra note 51, at 9. The
theory imports a conceptual distinction between "artificial" factors, such as governmental
regulation, and "real" factors, presumably economic forces. Although this Note argues
only that United States policy and regulation should be consistent, it might be that the
theory underlying this policy is not the best solution to the problem of world market
efficiency. According to the theory of second best, unless all of the optimal conditions for
economic efficiency can be attained, it may not be desirable to satisfy any individual
optimal condition. See Lipsey & Lancaster, The General Theory of Second Best, 24 REv.
ECON. STUD. 11 (1956). Thus, if foreign governments maintain restraints on international
trade, it is possible that the United States should not remove its tariffs and capital
controls. A second-best solution would have to be derived, given the violations of the
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litical objectives of this policy has been facilitation and protection of
United States investment abroad. 3
The policy has been codified in various multinational and bilateral
agreements. The Code of Liberalisation of Capital Movements, promul-
gated by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Develop-
ment (OECD), explicitly provides that all members shall allow certain
specified transactions, 54 including the "acquisition of full ownership of
an existing enterprise" 5 and the "[a]dmission of foreign securities on
the domestic capital markets."' 6 The General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade (GATT)'s 57 emphasis on reducing governmental interven-
tion in the international trading arena 8 also reflects this United States
optimal conditions. Usually, the second best general solution is so complex that the type
of adjustment required to improve efficiency is impossible to determine. See F. SCHERER,
INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRUCTURE AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 25 (1970); cf. Buchanan, Ex-
ternal Diseconomies, Corrective Taxes, and Market Structure, 59 AM. ECON. REV. 174
(1969) (example of indeterminable second best solution). The current American response
to violations of optimal conditions would be indeterminable.
53. Brownell, Foreign Investment in the United States Should not be Restricted, in
CURRENT LEGAL ASPECTS OF FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN THE UNITED STATES 57, 58 (D. Evans, J.
Forry, V. Narcisi, & M. Perlberger eds. 1976) (policy benefits U.S. corporations investing
abroad); see Note, supra note 51, at 154 (liberal trade policy creates expanded export
markets).
54. ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, CODE OF LIBERALISA-
TION OF CAPITAL MOVEMENTS art. 2(a) (1973 ed., updated June 1978) [hereinafter cited as
LIBERALISATION CODE].
55. rd. Annex A, List A, § I(A)(1); cf. id. Annex A, List A, § I(A)(3), remark (ii)
(listed transactions free unless they would have exceptionally detrimental effect on interest
of country). Remark (ii) appears to allow some pre-investment screening of individual
investment decisions. See Rising Tide, supra note 1, at 579. This exception does not
provide for systematic discrimination against transactions covered by List A, § 1. The
United States has attached a reservation to Article 2 concerning such transactions. The
reservation applies to statutory restrictions on alien investment in or control of certain
communication, transportation, and energy industries. LIBERALISATION CODE, supra note 54,
at 109. The United States has made no general reservations, however, to such transactions
or to any other part of the Liberalisation Code.
56. LIBERALISATION CODE, supra note 54, Annex A, List A, § III(B). The remark to this
section requires that securities admitted must have been "introduced in a recognised
security market of the country of issue" and must be subject to the regulations of the
domestic market. Id. Annex. A, List A, § III(B), remark. This second condition, however,
must be read in conjunction with the remark's prohibition of regulations that discriminate
against foreign securities.
57. Opened for signature Oct. 30, 1947, 55 U.N.T.S. 187. As of January 1, 1978, 83
parties had joined the treaty. GENERAL AGREEMENT ON TARIFFS AND TRADE, BASIC INSTRU-
MENTS AND SELEcTrE DOCUMENTS vii (Supp. No. 24, 1978).
58. See Weiss, The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade: An Assessment, in 2
UNITED STATES INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC POLICY IN AN INTERDEPENDENT WoRLD 451, 452
(1971) (discussing benefits of reduced governmental intervention).
A common theory appears to underlie both capital-movements policy and trade policy.
See, e.g., de Saint Phalle, Overview of Legal Problems Faced by a Foreign Business Enter-
prise Wishing to Establish a Base in the United States, in CURRENT LEGAL ASPECTS OF
FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN THE UNITED STATES 162, 163 (D. Evans, J. Forry, V. Narcisi, & M.
Perlberger eds. 1976); Note, supra note 51, at 157.
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policy.59 In addition, the United States has ratified Friendship Naviga-
tion and Commerce treaties with eleven countries.6" Those treaties
embody the "national treatment" principle, which prohibits the federal
government from imposing more severe restrictions on the nationals
of the other party than it does on its own citizens.61
Recent executive-branch activities reflect the policies underlying
these international agreements.6 2 In 1976 the President endorsed the
OECD Declaration on International Investment and Multinational
Enterprise. 03 Executive-branch statements on tax and securities regula-
tion have reaffirmed that policy. 64 Despite some public and congres-
sional concern over foreign direct investment,6 5 Congress has not
59. Although the Senate has never ratified GATT, the Congress has frequently
authorized trade negotiations under its aegis. See, e.g., Trade Expansion Act of 1962, Pub.
L. No. 87-794, § 201, 76 Stat. 872 (authorized negotiations for trade agreements and re-
forms); Trade Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-618, §§ 121-127, 88 Stat. 1978 (codified at
19 U.S.C. §§ 2131-2137 (1976)) (authorized negotiations for reform of GATT).
60. Note, supra note 1, at 137 n.221. The United States currently has such treaties with
Israel, Japan, Federal Republic of Germany, Nicaragua, The Netherlands, Republic of
Korea, Mussat & Oman, France, Luxembourg, Togo, and Thailand. Rising Tide, supra
note 1, at 568 n.63 (treaties assuring foreign investors right of access).
61. Rising Tide, supra note 1, at 569; Note, supra note 1, at 137. These treaties all
explicitly provide that foreign investors have the right to acquire majority interests in
United States companies. Id. at 568-69.
62. See, e.g., INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT 84 (1977) (affirming
policy of reducing governmental restrictions); COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 52, at 178
(recommending reduction of artificial governmental incentives and barriers to foreign
investment). The only recent exception to this trend was President Johnson's imposition
of certain capital controls. See Exec. Order No. 11,387, 33 Fed. Reg. 47 (1968). Under the
terms of this Order, the Secretary of Commerce established the Office of Foreign Direct
Investment in the Department of Commerce, which issued regulations restricting the out-
flow of capital from the United States to reduce the United States balance of payments
deficit. See Note, The Foreign Direct Investment Regulations, 1973: Balance of Payments
Remedy or Regulation of Multinational Corporations? 11 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 267, 267,
270-74 (1973).
63. INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT, supra note 62, at I; see
ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, INTERNATIONAL INVEST-
MENT AND MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES § II (1976) (endorsing national-treatment principle).
64. See COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 52, at 179 (taxes should not influence foreign
investment decisions); Garrett, supra note 42, at D-1 (SEC sees U.S. policy as encouraging
free flow of capital among nations); Greater Attention to Internationalization of Securities
Urged by Williams, SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA), June 20, 1970, at A-19 (reaffirming free
capital-movements policy) [hereinafter cited as Williams].
65. This concern has been acute in the area of land ownership. The jump in Japanese
investment in Hawaiian real estate sparked debate on limiting foreign investment in the
United States. See Note, U.S. Regulation of Foreign Direct Investment: Current Develop-
ments and the Congressional Response, 15 VA. J. INT'L L. 611 (1975). Another source of
this concern was the 1973 Arab oil boycott. See de Saint Phalle, supra note 58, at 167. The
concern is that foreign acquirers will exercise their control without considering domestic
interests, see, e.g., id. at 167-68 (Arab takeovers and political blackmail); Brownell, supra
note 53, at 59 (undesirable socio-political consequences), or to achieve foreign political
goals, see, e.g., McCarthy, Government Regulation of Foreign Investment in the United
States, in CURRENT LEGAL ASPECTS OF FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN THE UNITED STATES 84, 86
(1976). Those commentators, however, believe that such fears are unrealistic.
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opposed executive-branch policy on international capital flows.°6
In accordance with this free-trade policy, the United States has not
restricted foreign acquisition of domestic corporations for cash. 7 For
several reasons, neither should the government impede securities ac-
quisitions. First, the greater availability of securities acquisitions would
increase the number of avenues for entering the United States capital
market. 8 That development could facilitate the further influx of
technology 9 and foreign investment.70
Second, because securities acquisitions facilitate capital mobility,
their increased availability would improve world economic efficiency.
Increased availability would allocate world capital more efficiently by
providing another path for investment.71 Increased capital mobility
would encourage the internationalization of management and decision-
making.7 2 Equity ownership would be diversified to a greater extent
than cash acquisitions permit.73
66. Although several bills have been introduced in Congress to restrict foreign invest-
ment, none has become law. See, e.g., H.R. 158, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979) (authorizing
President to prohibit foreign direct investment for reasons of national security, foreign
policy, or economic protection); S. 1539, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979) (prohibiting foreigners
from acquiring financial institutions with assets over $100 million prior to April 1, 1981).
But cf. Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of 1980, Pub. L.
No. 96-221, § 902, 96 Stat. 193 (to be codified at 12 U.S. § 3101 note) (requiring Federal
Reserve Board moratorium of one year on acquisitions of United States banks by foreign
parties).
Congress has passed three laws that require collection of data on foreign investment in
the United States. Foreign Investment Study Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-479, 88 Stat. 1450
(codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78b note (1976)); International Investment Survey Act of 1976, Pub.
L. No. 93-472, 90 Stat. 2059 (codified at 22 U.S.C. §§ 3101-3108 (1976)); Agricultural Foreign
Investment Disclosure Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-460, 92 Stat. 1263 (to be codified at 7
U.S.C. §§ 3501-3508). These Acts provide only for information gathering, see Note, supra
note 1, at 141, and do not indicate any change in United States policy toward international
capital flows. Section 2(c) of the International Investment Study Act of 1976, Pub. L. No.
93-479, 88 Stat. 1450 (codified at 22 U.S.C. § 3101(c) (1976)), explicitly states that the Act
is not intended to restrain or deter foreign investment in the United States.
67. Foreigners have a number of financing alternatives. They may have cash on hand
or can borrow from foreign sources. They may also go to the Eurodollar market. More-
over, the regulations on bank loans, even in borrowing from United States banks, do not
distinguish between foreign and domestic borrowers. See Regulation U, 12 C.F.R. § 221.1(a)
(1979) (margin requirement for all loans secured by stock). One study concluded that
future direct investments will continue to be made using cash, obtained predominantly
from foreign sources, as consideration. I FoREIGN DErCT INVESTMENT, supra note 2, at 120.
68. This additional avenue might simply alter the distribution of acquisition structures
between cash and securities types, resulting in no net increase in foreign acquisitions;
alternatively, it might increase the actual number of acquisitions.
69. See GEORGETOWN STUDY, supra note 31, at 2; Weintraub, supra note 51, at 11.
70. See Weintraub, supra note 51, at 9. The United States will need additional sources
of capital in the near future. See Brownell, supra note 53, at 58-59; de Saint Phalle, supra
note 58, at 164.
71. See Weintraub, supra note 51, at 9.
72. See Ball, Address, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE CONFERENCE ON FOREIGN DIRECT INVEST-
M.ENT IN THE UNITED STATES 52, 59 (1970).
73. See id. at 59 (dispersion of equity ownership). Securities acquisitions increase the
1425
The Yale Law Journal
Third, the increased availability of the securities acquisition tech-
nique would further the internationalization of securities markets, a
professed goal of the United States.74 Such transactions would add to
the dispersion of securities ownership, thereby encouraging familiarity
with securities markets of other countries and thus facilitating capital
movements. 7 5 The increase in the number of international securities
transactions could also raise international disclosure standards.7 " These
three factors suggest that treatment of foreign securities acquisitions
should be consistent with general United States free-trade policy.
B. The Criterion of Effective Parity
These policies suggest a standard against which the treatment of
foreign acquirers should be assessed. A standard of regulative neutrality
would implement stated American policy and would be consistent with
its underlying world economic efficiency theory. The standard would
not require the elimination of all restrictions on capital movements;
rather, it would simply provide that treatment of capital transactions
not vary with the nationality of the acquiring party.
The standard of regulative neutrality would be analogous to the
principle of tax neutrality. Under that principle, the choice of location
for investment of capital should not be influenced by differences in
tax burdens imposed by various jurisdictions77 The underlying premise
number of parties holding securities of foreign corporations, whereas cash acquisitions
merely cause ownership to change hands.
The danger of United States shareholders being frozen-out of participation after a
foreign merger is slight. Mergers within the European Economic Community must leave
original shareholders with an equity participation in the new entity. A cash "equalization
payment" to the merged company's shareholders cannot exceed 10% of the nominal value
of the shares issued. Third Council Directive of October 9, 1978, art. 4(l), 22 O.J. Comrsf.
EUR. (No. C885), [1979] Cosiar. MtT. REP. (CCH) 1381. See note 2 supra (most acquirers
are nationals of EEC countries).
These various effects, while not necessarily unique to the increased availability of
securities acquisitions, are products of an increase in international capital movements;
wider use of securities in acquisitions would promote such an increase. See note 68 suPra;
Ball, supra note 72, at 58-60 (discussing role of multinationals in freeing up world trade).
74. See note 64 supra.
75. See Ball, supra note 72, at 56-57 (discussing foreign securities acquisition that
created active United States market in foreign parent's common stock).
76. See Stephens, supra note 37, at 170 (discussing SEC participation in international
efforts to raise disclosure standards). As securities markets become more interdependent,
one nation cannot operate its market without considering other markets. See Williams,
supra note 64, at A-19. A foreign acquirer could conduct a securities acquisition of a
domestic corporation outside the United States regulatory framework. Offshore equity
markets, analogous to the Eurodollar market, might someday enable acquirers to com-
pletely avoid American regulation. Cf. R. ALIBER, INTERNATIONAL MONEY GAmE 145-59 (3d
ed. 1979) (Eurodollar market operating outside regulatory jurisdictions).
77. P. MUSGRAVE, UNITED STATES TAXATION OF FOREIGN INVESTMENT INCOME 109 (1969)
(defining tax neutrality).
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of the tax neutrality principle is that worldwide efficiency in resource
allocation is optimized by nondiscriminatory tax treatment of capital
flows.7s The regulative-neutrality standard would adopt that premise 9
and apply it to regulations affecting foreign acquirers.
Under the regulative-neutrality standard, an investment decision
should be governed by the relevant economic and business variables,
not by the existence of disparate regulatory costs. The goal of the stan-
dard would be to produce a situation of decisional neutrality in which
investments of foreigners would not be impeded to a greater extent
than those of domestic parties.
The standard of regulative neutrality could be implemented by
application of a criterion of effective parity. Particular regulations
would satisfy the standard if the regulatory costs involved in an invest-
ment decision were equal for foreign and domestic parties.8 0 At the
same time effective parity must coordinate the aim of the neutrality
standard with the other policy goals of the regulations. Deviation from
effective parity would be justified only when the most narrows' and
78. Id. at 74-75, 109; cf. Ross, Basic Problems of Taxation of Foreign Direct Investment
in the United States, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE CONFERENCE ON FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT
IN THE UNITED STATES 94 (1970) (comments of Arthur Rothkopf) (Foreign Investors Tax
Act of 1966, Pub. L. 89-809, 80 Stat. 1539, sought, not to give foreign investors incentive to
invest in U.S., but rather to put them on parity with domestic investors.) The tax system
should not alter investment-decision considerations of risk and return. P. MUSGRAVE, supra
note 77, at 118.
79. See note 52 suPra.
80. "Equivalence" for the purposes of the regulative-neutrality standard cannot be
measured quantitatively. Tax neutrality focuses upon a final figure of tax liability for
the same investment. See P. MUsGRAvE, supra note 77, at 109. Regulative neutrality, by
contrast, would focus upon the underlying costs incurred in complying with the tax and
securities regulations in an acquisition. Equivalence in regulatory costs refers to an ef-
fectively equivalent-but not identical-regulatory burden on foreign and domestic ac-
quirers: even for two domestic firms, the same acquisition would involve disparate
regulatory costs given differences in management efficiency, corporate structure, and other
factors.
The effective-parity criterion would focus upon the effect of regulations as a cost in
the investment decision. That effect should be considered from the acquirer's standpoint.
A rule of formal equal treatment would not necessarily satisfy the criterion of effective
parity. When parties maintain different relationships to the regulatory framework, an
equal-treatment rule would have disparate impacts on the investment decision. The
purpose of interpreting the standard of regulative neutrality by effective parity is not
to compensate foreign acquirers for disadvantageous economic or business conditions, but
rather to eliminate disparate effects of regulation from the business decision of how to
structure an acquisition. The line between neutrality and compensation is a fine one.
81. "Narrowness" refers to the specificity of the behavior sought to be regulated. The
"overinclusiveness" theory of statutory invalidity is relevant here, not as a test of con-
stitutionality, but as a test of the practical appropriateness of a prescription. Cf. Perry,
Modern Equal Protection: A Conceptualization and Appraisal, 79 COLUmn. L. Rav. 1023,
1074 n.263 (1979) (discussing substantive due process versus equal protection theories of
overinclusiveness); Developments in the Law-Equal Protection, 82 HARv. L. REv. 1065,
1086 (1969) (over-inclusion less tolerable than under-inclusion).
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efficient82 regulatory device is used to achieve the specific policy of the
regulation.8 3
In sum, the criterion of effective parity could be used to evaluate a
particular regulatory framework for its consistency with the policy con-
tained in the standard of regulative neutrality. The test would consist
of two inquiries: are the regulatory costs imposed equivalent between
two investors; has the most narrow and efficient regulatory device been
used to implement the specific regulatory objective?
III. Achieving Effective Parity in Foreign Securities Acquisitions
The criterion of effective parity could be applied to the tax and
securities regulatory framework governing securities acquisitions. This
application suggests several regulatory modifications that would satisfy
the standard of regulative neutrality and thus make the treatment of
foreign acquirers more consistent with American policy on interna-
tional capital flows.
A. Amending the Tax Provisions
Securities acquisitions by foreigners are impeded by the compara-
tively higher regulatory costs imposed by section 367(a).s4 The adop-
tion of an establishment rule would remove this impediment without
jeopardizing the anti-tax evasion policy of the Code.
82. "Efficiency" denotes the minimization of regulatory costs in achieving the regulatory
policy, and it should be measured from the standpoint of the party affected. If the test is
the neutrality of the effect of a regulation on the structuring decision, regulations that
add costs to the structuring decision beyond those necessary to achieve the regulatory
policy are inefficient. An ancillary consequence of the efficiency requirement is that a
certain amount of the cost of regulation may shift to the regulatory agency. See note 134
infra. Precise regulations will involve greater initial promulgation and enforcement costs.
The extra costs will shift from the structuring decision of the acquirer to the activities
of the regulatory agency. Instead of individual foreign acquirers incurring the added
costs with each and every acquisition, the regulatory agency would be able to routinize
the procedures and thus raise the efficiency level of the regulation. The regulatory agency
would thus assume and minimize the regulatory cost differential between foreign and
domestic securities acquisitions.
83. A deviation from the standard of regulative neutrality would be justified only
when another policy goal was served and the deviation was as slight as possible. Cf.
Breyer, Analyzing Regulatory Failure: Mismatches, Less Restrictive Alternatives, and Re.
form, 92 HARV. L. Rav. 549, 586 (1979) (discussing least restrictive regulatory alternative);
Markham, Regulation of International Transactions Under the commodity Exchange Act,
48 FORDIAm L. RaV. 129, 157-58 (1979) (discussing necessity of using alternative measures
to achieve regulatory goals and accommodate international commodities trading).
84. See pp. 1418-19 supra.
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1. The Establishment Rule
In securities acquisitions of ongoing United States business entities,
the anti-tax evasion policy objective of section 367(a)8, is not relevant.
When the acquired corporation remains established in some form and
is engaged in trade or business within the United States,80 it will be
subject to the domestic corporate tax provisions.87 In such a situation,
a section 367(a) ruling is unnecessary, for the gain on expatriated ap-
preciated property can be taxed to the remaining entity.8 The regula-
tion is over-inclusive and thus violates both the narrow-and-efficient
and the equivalent-cost requirements of the effective-parity criterion.
An establishment rule could provide a basis for narrowing the regula-
tions to their specific policy objective and for reducing the foreign
acquirer's regulatory costs to a level of parity with domestic acquirers.
The rule would operate by distinguishing between securities acquisi-
tions that pose an evasion threat and those that do not. An appropriate
definition of "establishment" could be modeled on the jurisdictional
concept of permanent establishment 9 that has been used in double-
85. See note 22 supra (§ 367(a) seeks to prevent permanent non-recognition of appre-
ciated assets transferred abroad).
86. I.R.C. § 882(a)(1); see B. BirrrxR & J. EusricE, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF
CORPOxATIONS AND SHAREHOLDERS 17.02 (4th ed. 1979) (discussing factors that create U.S.
business situs).
87. Acquired entities that remain incorporated in the United States, whether in their
original form or as foreign-owned subsidiaries, are taxable. I.R.C. §§ 11, 1201. Foreign
branches that meet the "engaged in trade or business in the United States" requirement
are taxable on corporate income (as provided in I.R.C. § 11) and on corporate capital
gains (as provided in I.R.C. § 1201(a)). I.R.C. § 882(a)(1).
88. See Pugh & Samuels, supra note 13, at 273. This overly broad regulatory approach
may facilitate IRS enforcement by reducing its costs, see note 82 supra, but it violates
effective parity.
Some "leakage" of assets out of the country may occur even when the entity survives
the acquisition. The critical fact is that some taxable entity remains within the United
States tax jurisdiction. Leakage poses two problems for the IRS. First, the IRS must be
able to detect the existence of the leakage. If the entity continues to exist in the United
States, then the detection problem is comparable to that with respect to domestic com-
panies. Second, the IRS must be able to enforce a tax deficiency determination. Provided
that the entity remains in the United States, this poses no special problem. The allocation
provision of section 482, for example, provides a general enforcement mechanism for the
prevention of tax evasion through related foreign and domestic corporations. See Note,
Multinational Corporations and Income Allocation under Section 482 of the Internal
Revenue Code, 89 HARv. L. REv. 1202, 1204 (1976). If the IRS determines that an
appreciated asset has been transferred out of the United States' taxing jurisdiction, in-
come is allocated to the domestic entity.
89. See Pugh & Samuels, U.S. Tax Aspects of Acquisitions of U.S. Corporations by
Foreign Corporations, 34 N.Y.U. INsT. FED. TAX 991, 1005 (1976); Pugh & Samuels, supra
note 13, at 263 n.l.
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taxation treaties9 ° and two European Economic Community (EEC)
proposals. 91 The appropriate rule under the criterion would be that
no ruling is necessary if the acquirer intends to maintain a United
States business entity.92 As in domestic reorganizations, an acquirer
could request a ruling in an ambiguous case.93
2. Applying the Establishment Rule
A type-B transaction that satisfies the establishment rule should be
exempted from the ruling requirement.94 A type-B acquisition, whether
direct or by means of a domestic subsidiary, leaves a corporate entity
within the tax jurisdiction of the United States. As in a domestic type-B
reorganization, recognition of capital gains would be deferred until a
break in the continuity of interest. 95 The proposed modification leaves
both foreign and domestic acquirers with equivalent regulatory costs.
A similar change should be made for type-C reorganizations that
involve a sale of assets to a United States subsidiary of a foreign
acquirer. In such cases, title to the assets passes to a domestic corpora-
tion.96 This is not essentially different from a type-C sale of assets
between two domestic corporations. The same consideration holds for
90. See, e.g., U.S. Convention with the French Republic with Respect to Taxes on
Income and Property, July 28, 1967, art. 4, 19 U.S.T. 5280, 5288, T.I.A.S. No. 6518;
ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, MODEL DOUBLE TAXATION
CONVENTION ON INCOME AND ON CAPITAL art. 5 (1977).
91. European Communities Commission, Proposal For a Council Regulation on the
Statute for European Companies, reprinted in BULLETIN OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES
119-21 (Supp. April 1975) ("permanent establishment" concept defines taxing authority
over business entities in Member countries); European Communities Commission, Proposed
Council Directive on the Common Tax System for Mergers, Split-u ps, and Transfers of
Assets Involving Companies of Different Member States, reprinted in I CoMm. MKT. REP.
(CCH) 3214 (Jan. 15, 1969) (capital gains not taxed if capital assets of acquired establish-
ment not transferred out of acquired's domicile).
92. Such a rule would differ from the "engaged in trade or business within the United
States" concept, see p. 1429 & note 86 supra, and the jurisdictional use of the permanent
establishment concept, see note 90 suPra. Those concepts provide rules for the assertion of
jurisdiction over income by taxing authorities. The rule proposed predicts future tax
liability: it indicates the conditions under which the acquisition will not constitute a
capital gains recognition event by qualifying as a tax-free reorganization.
93. See Sinrich & Baller, Payment in Buyer's Stock-Tax-Free Acquisitions of Busi-
nesses-The Tax-Free Reorganization, in I BUSINESS ACQUISITIONS: PLANNING AND PRACTICE
463, 501 (J. Herz & C. Baller eds. 1971) (ruling may be initial negotiating goal of acquired).
94. This proposal would replace the 50%-controlling interest limitation of the Guide.
lines. Rev. Proc. 68-23, 1968-1 C.B. 821, § 3.03(l)(d); see notes 25 & 26 supra (discussing
Guideline requirements).
95. At such a break, the capital gains would be realized and could be recognized. See
B. BITTKER & J. EUSTICE, supra note 86, 14.11 (discussing continuity of interest test).
96. It is questionable whether this is even an "outbound" transfer, see Pugh &
Samuels, supra note 13, at 276, although the legislative history indicates that it should be
included in that category, see 1976 HoUsE REPORT, supra note 22, at 243.
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straight and reverse subsidiary mergers.97 Effective parity requires that
the transactions in these cases be exempt from the ruling requirement
if they satisfy the establishment rule.
Application of the establishment rule would also remove the need
for the toll charge assessed by rulings in direct type-C reorganizations.
This toll charge treatment is based on the treatment applied to foreign
firms involved in section 351 transfers to controlled corporations.9 8
The tax evasion potential in the type-C situation, however, is reduced,
because unlike the section 351 case, the acquired firm does not gain
control of the acquirer.9 9 The evasion potential is reduced, in addition,
because the transaction is designed to gain control of an ongoing
business entity rather than possession of certain assets for a break-up
and resale.100 When the acquired corporation meets the conditions of
the establishment rule, it will remain subject to the United States tax
jurisdiction. If direct type-C transactions were exempted from the sec-
tion 367(a) ruling requirement and the toll charge assessment, effective
parity would be achieved.
Discrimination against foreign acquirers under section 368(a)(1)(A)
with respect to direct type-A statutory mergers also has no clear policy
purpose.' 0 ' A direct merger is similar to a direct type-C purchase of
assets in which dissolution of the corporation is an integral step.'02 The
regulations should therefore permit direct type-A mergers to occur if
they meet the conditions of the establishment rule.
In sum, the section 367(a) regulations should explicitly exempt from
the ruling requirement the classes of transactions that satisfy the estab-
lishment rule. 0 3 In addition, the section 368 regulations should be
modified to permit direct type-A mergers. Adoption of the establish-
ment rule10 4 would satisfy the effective-parity criterion by narrow-
97. See Pugh & Samuels, supra note 13, at 276.
98. See note 26 supra. A section 351 reorganization involves a transfer of property to a
corporation in exchange for stock or securities; after the transfer, the transferor is in
control of the transferee. I.R.C. § 351.
99. See note 26 supra.
100. The guidelines contemplate removal of individual assets from the United States
tax jurisdiction. Rev. Proc. 68-23, 1968-1 C.B. 821, § 3.02(l)(c) (giving examples of trade-
mark expatriation).
101. See note 27 supra. Although individual states often require that merging corpora-
tions be incorporated domestically, see id., no policy objective is achieved by federal tax
regulations adopting this requirement.
102. The inclusion of both of these types of transactions under the securities regula-
tions, Rule 145, 17 C.F.R. § 230.145 (1979); see note 10 supra (discussing treatment of assets
and merger transactions), is indicative of this similarity.
103. The IRS has the statutory authority to promulgate such a rule. I.R.C. § 367(a)(2).
104. The IRS has a congressional mandate to provide such an exemption in cases in
which it finds that the transactions have no evasion potential. See 1976 Housa REPORT,
supra note 22, at 241.
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ing the regulatory cost to transactions that actually pose a danger
of evasion, and by placing foreign acquirers in a position of effective
parity with respect to regulatory costs. Both the standard of regulative
neutrality and the tax policy goals of the Internal Revenue Code could
thus be satisfied.
B. Amending the Securities Provisions
The paramount concern in any modification of the securities regula-
tory framework is maintenance of adequate investor protection.105 The
subject of foreign securities offerings in the United States has in gen-
eral been characterized by the tension between this concern and the
policy of removing barriers to international capital movements. 00
Effective parity would require that implementation of regulative
neutrality not impair the policy of full and fair disclosure.
The higher regulatory costs of a foreign acquirer result from its
relationship to the domestic regulatory framework.0 7 Application of
the effective-parity criterion could lead to a different disclosure scheme
for foreign acquirers that would bring their regulatory costs closer to
those of domestic acquirers. Such a modification could be made without
jeopardizing investor protection by implementing the regulatory goal
more narrowly and efficiently. The modifications proposed are based
upon current SEC policies and rules that distinguish foreign from
domestic issuers and that seek to integrate Exchange Act and Securities
Act disclosure requirements.
105. See note 32 supra.
106. Cf. Bodolus, The Internationalization of Securities Markets, 29 Bus. LAw. 107,
109-11 (Supp. 1974) (discussing features of European market that conflict with investor
protection). For a general discussion of use of United States capital markets by foreign
issuers, see I L. Loss, SECURITIEs REGULATION 363-68 (2d ed. 1961); 4 id. at 2393-98 (Supp.
1969); Stephens, supra note 37. Some commentators have suggested alterations in the
regulatory framework in order to facilitate foreign use of the United States securities
markets. See, e.g., Bator, supra note 39, at 325 (suggesting "home-to-home" privilege to
issuers); Levenson, The Application of United States Securities Laws to Securities Transac-
tions Made in the United States by Canadian Entities, 31 Bus. LAw. 817, 825 (1976) (recom-
mending reciprocal registration with Canadian provinces); Stephens, supra note 37, at
173-78 (discussing various recommendations, including extending Regulation A exemption
to subscription rights offerings, providing other investor safeguards besides disclosure,
promulgating official guide for accommodations, promulgating exemptions for issuers from
specific countries, institutionalizing requests for additional information from foreign
issuers now made in SEC comment letter, and expanding Form S-7 for use by foreign
issuers).
107. See Stephens, supra note 37, at 150; cf. Exchange Act Rel. No. 16,371, 44 Fed. Reg.
70,132 (1979) (policy of permitting Exchange Act disclosure information to be relied on in
lieu of Securities Act disclosure information for certain foreign private issuers); Securities
Act Rel. No. 6177, 45 Fed. Reg. 5934 (1980) (proposed Form S-15 furthering integration
policy); Mann, New Proposals Will Integrate Securities Disclosure Requirements, Nat'l
L.J., Mar. 3, 1980, at 26.
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1. Current SEC Policy on Foreign Issuers
Under the Exchange Act, the SEC has adopted a policy of systematic
accommodation for foreign issuers.108 The SEC recently reaffirmed
this policy by adopting a new form, Form 20-F, 109 that allows foreign
issuers to register securities for trading in United States markets under
less stringent disclosure requirements than those applicable to domestic
issuers."" Foreign issuers are not obligated to file quarterly reports,"'
and the periodic report form used by foreign issuers" 2 requires much
less information than its domestic counterpart." 3 Another aspect of the
accommodation policy is the exemption granted"14 certain foreign is-
suers from the proxy disclosure requirements and insider-trading provi-
sions of the Exchange Act."3  These provisions indicate that the SEC
108. See Garrett, supra note 42, at D-2 to D-3; Stephens, supra note 36, at 503-10. Pur-
suant to section 12(g)(3) of the Exchange Act, the SEC grants exemptions from registration
to foreign issuers whose securities are traded in the over-the-counter markets. Rule 12g3-2,
17 C.F.R. § 240.12g3-2 (1979).
109. Exchange Act Rel. No. 16,371, 44 Fed. Reg. 70,132 (1979). Form 20-F is avail-
able for foreign issuers that register under sections 12(b), 12(g), or 15(d) of the Exchange
Act. Although Form 20-F is more stringent than the forms it replaces, Form 20, 17 C.F.R.
§ 249.220 (1979) (Exchange Act foreign issuer registration form), and Form 20-K, 17
C.F.R. § 249.320 (1979) (Exchange Act foreign issuer annual report form), it is less de-
manding than the originally proposed Form 20-F, Exchange Act Rel. No. 14,128, 42 Fed.
Reg. 58,684 (1977), which would have essentially eradicated the different treatment of
foreign issuers. See Stephens, supra note 36, at 519-22 (describing previous reporting regime).
110. Exchange Act Rel. No. 16,371, 44 Fed. Reg. 70,132 (1979). Form 20-F requires less
disclosure than its domestic counterpart, Form 10-K, 17 C.F.R. § 249.310 (1979), in the
following areas: general instructions (six-month, rather than four-month, filing period);
description of business (less stringent industry segment reporting requirements); control
of registrant (reportable ownership percentage 10% instead of 5%); directors and officers
(only names and positions, not business experience and general background); management
remuneration (only aggregate amount paid); pending legal proceedings (no disclosure of
environmental litigation); interest of management in certain transactions (only required
when being made public); exhibits (list of parents and subsidiaries required only upon
request by SEC); and financial statements (not required to comply with U.S. generally
accepted accounting principles or Regulation S-X, but must discuss differences in principles
used). See Exchange Act Rel. No. 16,371, supra. In addition, the following items of dis-
closure are not required at all: summary of operations, recent sales of unregistered securi-
ties and indebtedness, submission of matters to a vote of security holders, acquisition or
disposition of assets, and changes in registrant's certifying accountant. Some of these
items were eliminated because they are disclosed elsewhere in the form. Id.
111. 17 C.F.R. § 240.13a-13(b)(2) (1979).
112. Form 6-K, 17 C.F.R. § 249.306 (1979), as amended by 44 Fed. Reg. 70,132, 70,138
(1979) (requires disclosure only of material made public or available to shareholders).
113. Form 8-K, 17 C.F.R. § 249.308 (1979); see Stephens, supra note 36, at 522-23
(discussing Form 8-K requirements).
114. Rule Sa12-3, 17 C.F.R. § 240.3a12-3 (1979), as amended by 44 Fed. Reg. 70,132,
70,137 (1979).
115. The exemption applies to issuers that use Form 20-F. Exchange Act §§ 14(a)-(c),
16, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78n(a)-(c), 78p (1976); see Stephens, supra note 36, at 496.
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has determined that systematic accommodations for foreigners under
the Exchange Act do not jeopardize investor protection.'"
The SEC has also acted under the Securities Act to facilitate use of
domestic capital markets by foreign issuers. In this area, however, the
SEC has permitted only ad hoc accommodations in the preparation of
registration statements by foreigners,"" rather than adopting a separate
reporting system. Such treatment increases the regulatory costs of the
foreign acquirer."18 Although the disclosure objectives of both Acts are
the same,"19 their respective treatments of foreign issuers are incon-
sistent.
In dealing with domestic issuers, the SEC has recently embarked
upon a program of integrating the disclosure requirements of the Ex-
change Act and the Securities Act.120 An early application of that policy
occurred in the acquisition context.' 2' Securities Act registration under
116. See Exchange Act Rel. No. 16,871, 44 Fed. Reg. 70,132 (1979). But see Stephens,
supra note 36, at 519-21 (expressing concern about adequacy of investor protection).
117. See note 43 supra. Compare Securities Act Rel. No. 5893, 42 Fed. Reg. 65,554
(1977) (no industry-segment reporting exemption for foreign issuers) with Exchange Act
Rel. No. 16,371, 44 Fed. Reg. 70,132 (1979) (modifying industry-segment reporting require-
ment in adoption of Form 20-F).
118. See pp. 1420-21 supra.
119. ADvisoRY COMMITTEE ON CORPORATE DISCLOSURE, REPORT TO THE SECURITIES AND
EXCHANGE COMMISSION, 95TH CONG., IST SEss. 347 (Comm. Print No. 29, 1977) [hereinafter
cited as ADVISORY COMmITrEE REPORT]; see Letter from President Roosevelt to Congress
(Feb. 9, 1934), reprinted in S. REP. No. 792, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 1-2 (1934) (Exchange Act
second step to Securities Act in broad purpose of protecting investors); Anderson, The
Disclosure Process in Federal Securities Regulation: A Brief Review, 25 HASTINGS L.J.
311, 329 (1974) (two basic purposes served by disclosure requirements of both acts). The
Advisory Committee recommended adoption of a coordinated disclosure form, Form CD,
to replace all registration and reporting forms under both Acts. ADVISORY CoMMITrr= RE-
PORT, suPra, at 428.
120. The 1969 Wheat Report recommended administrative measures to integrate the
disclosure systems under the Securities Act and the Exchange Act. SECURITIES AND EX-
CHANGE COMMISSION, DISCLOSURE TO INVESTORS (1969). As a result of this report, the SEC
made several changes: it expanded the availability of the shortened registration form,
Form S-7; it adopted the short form for the registration of secondary offerings and sub-
scription or conversion offerings, Form S-16; and it adopted Rule 145, which provides
for the registration of acquisition offerings on Form S-14. These forms depend in part
upon prior compliance with Exchange Act disclosure requirements (Forms S-7 and S-16)
or on the use of Exchange Act type disclosures (Form S-14, see note 10 supra).
The 1977 Report of the SEC's Advisory Committee on Corporate Disclosure recom-
mended to the SEC a complete integration of the disclosure systems under the Acts.
ADVIsoRY COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 119, at 425. The SEC has continued to pursue
this policy.
121. The SEC apparently considers this context an appropriate one for application of
the integration policy. In addition to the promulgation of Rule 145, the SEC has
recently proposed Form S-15. Securities Act Rel. No. 6177, 45 Fed. Reg. 5934 (1980). This
new form would be available for exchange offers, see note 9 supra, as well as for mergers
and asset purchases under Rule 145. Eligibility for use of the shortened form would be
determined by eligibility for Form S-7-primarily, United States incorporation and
previous compliance with Exchange Act disclosure requirements.
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Rule 145122 of securities used in acquisitions is similar to the proxy
disclosure requirements of the Exchange Act.12 3 The financial state-
ments required by the Rule 145 registration form 2 4 generally must
conform to those required by Form 10,125 the general Exchange Act
registration form for domestic issuers.121 Full Form S-1 registration,
otherwise required under the Securities Act, is not necessary in these
acquisition situations. This integration policy should be followed when
considering the SEC's treatment of foreign acquirers.
The SEC has recently begun to take certain actions more consistent
with the Exchange Act treatment of foreign issuers. The Commission
has provided systematic accommodations to foreign issuers in the regis-
tration of subscription offerings. 127 These accommodations indicate
that international capital movements can be facilitated without com-
promising the full-and-fair disclosure policy of the Securities Act.128
In accordance with the SEC's integration policy, the systematic accom-
modations for foreign issuers under the Exchange Act should be ex-
tended to acquisition registrations of foreign acquirers.
2. Alternative Modifications
The criterion of effective parity suggests two possible modifications
of the securities regulatory framework. 29 Both attempt to narrow the
122. 17 C.F.R. § 230.145 (1979).
123. See note 10 supra.
124. Form S-14, 17 C.F.R. § 239.23 (1979).
125. 17 C.F.R. § 249.210 (1979).
126. Schneider & Manko, Rule 145, 5 REv. SEC. Rr. 811, 820 (1972).
127. Securities Act Rel. No. 6156, 44 Fed. Reg. 70,131 (1979). Foreign issuers will be
permitted to register pro rata rights offerings on the shorter Form S-16 without satisfying
certain eligibility criteria.
Form S-16 requires substantially less disclosure than Form S-1 or S-7, on which a foreign
issuer would normally have to register a subscription offering. Cf. Williams, Trading in
the United States in Foreign Securities and Securities Distributed Outside the United
States Without Registration under the Securities Act of 1933, in SIXTH ANNUAL INsTITUTE
ON SECURITIEs REMULATION 327, 335-40 (1975) (discussing problems of rights offerings prior
to Securities Act Rel. No. 6156). Domestic issuers must satisfy Form S-7 eligibility re-
quirements, but foreign issuers will be exempted from some of these. Securities Act Rel.
No. 6156, 44 Fed. Reg. 70,131 (1979) (in place of Form S-7 eligibility requirements, must
furnish English translation of annual report or latest Form 20-F).
Another recent accommodation to foreign issuers was made in the area of disclosure of
management remuneration. Securities Act Rel. No. 6157, 44 Fed. Reg. 70,130 (1979)
(aggregate group disclosure only).
128. Securities Act Rel. No. 6156, 44 Fed. Keg. 70,131 (1979); Securities Act Rel. No.
6157, 44 Fed. Reg. 70,130 (1979). Former SEC Chairman Garrett, in 1974, left open the
possibility of systematic accommodation under the Securities Act. See Garrett, supra note
42, at D-1 ("When the -ame problem tends to become a regular and general matter, then
we must think further and more broadly and consider adopting rules and forms.")
129. See note 106 supra (discussing commentators' recommendations for alterations to
accommodate foreign issuers).
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securities regulations in the foreign-securities acquisition context in
order to reduce the conflict between the policies of investor protection
and unimpeded capital movements.
The first modification involves extension of the disclosure philosophy
of Rule 145. Foreign acquirers should be permitted to route the Securi-
ties Act registration of their acquisition securities through the Exchange
Act disclosure structure.1 0 This could be accomplished by allowing the
use of the foreign issuer equivalent to the Exchange Act registration
form, Form 20-F, or some analogue.' 3 ' Once registered, the securities
would be subject to the current foreign-issuer disclosure regime of the
Exchange Act.
The alternative modification would be to design a Securities Act
registration form specifically for foreign acquirers. 32 Such a form
would make systematic13  the accommodations currently granted to
foreign issuers on an ad hoc basis. In addition, specific changes in the
extent of disclosure could be made. Guides to a new form or different
forms could be tailored to the accounting and business practices of
various home countries of acquirers. 134 The necessary accommodations
would vary with each country's regulatory framework. 35
In addition to implementing regulative neutrality, these modifica-
130. Under Rule 145, domestic acquirers are already permitted to route their Securities
Act disclosure through section 14A proxy requirements and Form 10. See pp. 1434-35
suPra.
131. An analogue could be a new Securities Act form or some modification of Form
S-14, which incorporates the Exchange Act reporting structure for foreign issuers. In
1972, the SEC did consider formal exemptions for foreign acquirers when it promulgated
Rule 145. See Securities Act Rel. No. 5316, 37 Fed. Reg. 23,631 (1972). The SEC rejected
such exemptions as inconsistent with investor protection under the Securities Act. The
1972 position of the SEC should be abandoned, in light of the promulgation of Form
20-F, the adoption of certain systematic accommodations under the Securities Act, the
SEC's policy of integrating Securities Act and Exchange Act disclosure requirements, and
international capital movement policy considerations.
132. This would amount to a modified double-standard for foreign acquirers. See
Brownell, Cohen, Heller, Loss, & Stevenson, Legal Problems of Issuing and Marketing
Foreign Securities in the United States, in INTERNATIONAL FINANCING AND INVESTMENT 430,
456-57 (J. McDaniels ed. 1964); Cohen & Throop, Investment of Private Capital in Foreign
Securities, in A LAWYER'S GUIDE TO INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS 519, 566 (%V.
Surrey & C. Shaw eds. 1963) (not providing separate disclosure scheme runs counter to
U.S. policy).
133. Several commentators have called for a more systematic method of accommodation.
See, e.g., Stephens, supra note 37, at 175-76 (promulgate guides); cf. Garrett, supra note
42, at D-I (some form of systematization might be required in future).
134. See Stephens, supra note 37, at 175-77. Because a limited number of countries
produce the vast majority of foreign acquirers, see note 2 supra, this suggestion would
not be unwieldy to implement. It would, however, result in greater expense to the SEC
in preparing individual forms or guides. On the other hand, the regulatory compliance
costs to the foreign acquirer would decrease. See note 82 supra.
135. For example, the form for British and Japanese acquirers would require few
changes in the acquirer's financial statements. Stephens, supra note 37, at 158-59.
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tions might also be the most appropriate way of encouraging higher
international disclosure standards. 136 The proposals balance the com-
peting policy approaches of holding the foreign acquirer to strict
American requirements137 and giving it a blanket exemption. 38 Either
proposal would enable foreign acquirers to enter the United States
securities market and then to adjust gradually to the domestic level of
disclosure.
Conclusion
The modifications in the tax and securities regulatory framework
proposed in this Note would increase the feasibility of securities acquisi-
tions for foreign acquirers. By approaching effective parity in the struc-
turing decision of foreign acquirers, United States policy on capital
movements could be furthered without sacrificing the goals of prevent-
ing tax evasion and protecting investors. Regulations consistent with
this policy would contribute to the orderly development and expan-
sion of an international securities market.
136. See Bodolus, supra note 106, at 111-12 (discussing role of SEC accommodations in
raising international disclosure standards).
137. See Stephens, supra note 37, at 164-69; cf. Exchange Act Rel. No. 14,128, 42 Fed.
Reg. 58,684 (1977) (original Form 20-F proposal holding foreign issuers to domestic dis-
closure standards).
138. Bator, supra note 39, at 325 (reciprocal registration with foreign countries); cf.
Levenson, supra note 106, at 825 (recommending reciprocal registration with Canadian
provinces).
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